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ABSTRACT 
Escalation stickins with an ailing project beyond rational justifications. This happens because in 
the face of negative feedback, decision makers are strangled between whether to stick with or 
quit the dying project. Environmental uncertainty has been identified as the root cause of the 
escalatory behavior. This uncertainty emanates from several sources relating to individual, 
group, organization and broader environmental factors. This paper argues the premise that 
effective communication can help create an environment whereby workforce can develop an 
organized action thereby distributing the responsibility across the whole workforce and not the 
individuals – leading to the possible reduction of escalatory behavior in IT projects. 
Keywords: IT Projects, Escalatory Behavior, Causes, Tactics, Uncertainty Reduction, Effective 
Communication, De-Escalation 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION   
 
There is an overwhelming regularity of escalation among IT projects that casts 
tremendous burden on the economy (Chee-Wee et al., 2006). Keil et al., (2000) found 
 
Kundi, G.M., Nawaz, A., Shah, B. 326
 
that “between 30% and 40% of all IS projects exhibit some degree of escalation.” 
Likewise, escalation is a common and costly problem among IT Projects (Pan et al., 
2004).  In the words of Warne and Hart (1996) “project failures in IT are a costly 
problem and troubled projects are not uncommon.” Whatever the causes of failure, 
‘escalatory behavior’ takes on the underlying role of leading more aggravated decision-
situations for the IT project. As Keil et al., (1998) put it, “very often the amount of 
money already spent on a project (sunk cost) along with other factors can bias managers 
toward continuing to fund the project.”  
The problem of escalation, however, is neither simple to comprehend nor 
addressable outright because, “we know little about how decision makers actually 
experience mounting evidence of failure in a project; what it feels to be confronted with 
a dilemma of whether to stick with an ailing project or abandon it; and most 
importantly, what informs their actions (Drummond, 1995).” 
Several behavioral models have been suggested as to explain the nature and 
process of this problem. For example, “decision makers are susceptible to the influence 
of self-serving psychological biases, which departs from the rational decision making 
model of investment (Chee-Wee et al., 2006).” Likewise, Chee-Wee et al., (2006) 
suggest, decision makers tend to escalate their commitment to a failing course of action 
and undergo the risk of negative outcomes in order to self-justify prior behavior or 
avoid revealing their errors to others.  
Mark Keil et al., (2000) developed a solution model using self-justification 
theory, prospect theory, agency theory, and approach avoidance theory. Pan et al., 
(2004) used the learning model of “unfreezing-changing-refreezing” to understand the 
escalatory behavior in IT projects and thereby figure out a solution model. However, 
almost all of these models are efforts to improve ‘COMMUNICATION’ between the 
project stakeholders. This research is a contribution in the same line of exploration. 
 
2. ESCALATORY BEHAVIOR 
 
Research shows that “if organizational culture is one that: a. makes people 
unwilling to admit failure or b. values consistency in behavior, then it is more likely that 
decision makers may even stick with their bad decisions for more than rationally 
required (Brockner et al., 1986).” When this happens “projects take a life of their own 
thereby eating up more resources and delivering no real value (Warne and Hart, 1996; 
Keil et al., 2000; Hall, 2003).” Research reveals that organizations continue to invest in 
their original course of action even after receiving substantial negative information 
concerning its advisability (Chee-Wee et al., 2006).  This continued investment 
eventually results in greater losses for the organization than if a change in the course of 
action was instituted (Biyalogorsky et al., 2004). 
 
2.1 What: The Definition 
It is said that “a trapped administrator is one who remains inflexible to change in 
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the face of negative consequences (Fox and Staw, 1979)”. Helga Drummond (1995) 
says that escalation is “a situation where decision makers are believed to compound the 
problem by persisting irrationally.”  She (1991) found that “escalation happens due to 
the nature of investment, psychological factors and organizational factors, while 
potential for escalatory behavior shoots up if costs exceed predictions, revenues fall 
short of prediction and both these occur simultaneously.” So it can be asserted that IT 
projects are gambles and will continue as such (Hall, 2003). 
 
2.2 Why: The Causes 
Most of the researchers agree on the four fundamental causes of escalation as 
being: a. project-related. b. human psychology/personality c. social and d. 
organizational (see for example, Brockner, 1992; Keil, 1995, 1998, 2000; Hall, 2003; 
Biyalogorsky et al., 2004; Pan et al., 2004; Chee-Wee et al., 2006; Kundi and Nawaz, 
2006). Researchers, however, express the causes in different ways. Fox and Staw (1979) 
suggest that a manager escalates if “he makes the initial decisions (responsibility 
pressure)” and/or “is under the pressure of being responsible for the consequences.” 
They also point out that job insecurity and policy resistance also increase the 
commitment to a previously chosen decision. 
A decision maker faced with negative feedback about a project may feel the 
need to reaffirm the wisdom of time and money already sunk into the project (Kundi, 
1997; Kundi et al., 2007). White (1986) asserts “commitment to a failing course of 
action is a need on the part of decision makers to maintain the illusion that they haven’t 
erred.” This happens because, as Staw and Ross (1981) put it, even in the face of 
negative feedback decision makers “continue investing commitment to a dying course 
on the assumption that short-term problems are the necessary costs/losses for achieving 
long-term large objectives.” 
 
2.3 How: The Tactics Used 
Several tactics are used by the escalating decision makers to protect their 
decisions, use of resources and thus themselves. This happens both at the cognitive and 
physical levels of expression. For example, Fox and Staw, (1979) found that decision 
makers “cognitively distort the negative feedback.” Warne and Hart (1996) record 
“when faced with failure, decision makers attempt to justify their position by 
manipulating information that is to be presented to others”, while, Brockner (1992) 
found that “powerful decision makers who are able to control information create false 
sense of progress.” 
Drummond (1995) continues in the same line of evidence by documenting 
“trapped decision makers seek out that information which supports their opinion while 
rejecting the contradictory data.” Lacity and Hirschheim (1995) also come up with the 
same finding that managers “constantly justify their cost-service compromises to 
various stakeholders. The tactics used are: a. picking a reference group of only mediocre 
performers b. undermining the integrity of data collection process and c. selecting 
technical benchmarks which stakeholders cannot understand.” 
Above points come together into the idea that the most dominant tool in the 
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hands of almost all the decision makers is feedback. They can manipulate 
communication and reporting systems. The decision makers “appear to seek out only 
that information which supports their prior decisions and ignore what contradicts them 
(Drummond, 1995).” Thus, adding fuel to the fire, those who have comparatively more 
control on information resources can be the experts in impression management. 
 
3. ESCALATION IN IT-PROJECTS 
 
There is a huge body of documented evidence about the escalatory dimensions 
of well-reported IS failure cases around the world (see for example, Ewusi-Mensah and 
Przasnyski, 1991, 1994; Sauer, 1993, 1999; McGrath, 1997; Kundi et al., 2007). 
However, it should not be forgotten that “failure in IT projects is a costly problem 
(Waema and Walshman, 1990).” Furthermore, “escalation can occur with any project 
but IT projects are more susceptible because it is very difficult to accurately estimate 
how much work has been completed (Keil, 1995).” 
The reason to this fact is that “IT projects are always innovative therefore highly 
uncertain and risky by nature (Clark, 1994).” Likewise, “as organizations become more 
computerized, software projects will consume an ever-increasing amount of 
organizational resources (Keil, 1998 et, al.).” To err is human but project failure is 
wasteful and embarrassing. Both public- and private-sector projects seek to avoid failure 
(Hall, 2003).  
 
4. DISCUSSION: DE-ESCALATION 
 
To err is human; to forgive is not the policy of the administration.” The plethora 
of explanations and disagreements about the causes of escalatory behavior represents a 
challenge for both the organization and researchers (Biyalogorsky et al., 2004); 
However, solution models to understand and de-escalate have been suggested by 
researchers ranging from very simple to comprehensive guidelines. As said earlier, the 
issue is not that simple because, “even for the most profitable companies not all projects 
meet with success; cost overruns, revenue shortfalls and bad news of other sorts are all 
too common and often the decision to be made is when to cut off a losing project before 
it takes the resources down with it (Warne and Hart, 1996).” Given this, escalation can 
be controlled by reducing the environmental uncertainty through effective 
communication systems in the organization. 
 
4.1 Uncertainty Reduction 
Environmental uncertainty is frequently cited as the main underlying cause of 
escalation (see for example, Bowen, 1987; Brockner, 1992; Clark, 1994; Drummond, 
1995; Keil et al., 1998, 2000; Biyalogorsky et al., 2004; Sharette, 2005; Chee-Wee et 
al., 2006; Kundi et al., 2007). For instance, “decision makers operate in somewhat of an 
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information vacuum; they lack data, which might help deciding whether it is wise to 
persist with the previous course of action? So it is the uncertainty surrounding the goal 
attainment which confuses the decision maker (Brockner, 1992).” It becomes a bigger 
issue when taken in the background of the fact that “there are differences among 
individuals in their perception and tolerance for uncertainty (Duncan, 1972).” All the 
organizations develop several communication systems to reduce uncertainty from the 
work environment of the managers. If these systems are weak, they themselves are 
exploited for escalation however, effectively structured and managed communication 
can ensure reduced uncertainty and thus less chances of escalation. 
 
4.2 Effective Communication to De-Escalate 
It is said that “we are worse in communication (Smith, 1997)” because of many 
reasons such as “under pressure decision makers discard information, avoid brining in 
expertise and exploring new alternatives and simplify a problem to a point where it 
becomes manageable (Keen, 1981).” This situation can however be reversed by 
focusing on the communication aspects of the organization since “through effective 
communication, organized action can occur despite differences of interpretation among 
members of a group (Donnellon et al., 1986).” 
The causes of escalation (independent variable) determine the shape and 
intensity of the escalatory behavior (dependent variable). However, this relationship is 
influenced by the managers through applying the ‘moderating variable’. “Moderating 
variable has strong contingent effect on the independent and dependent variables 
relationship (Sekaran, 1999).” It implies that the relationship between independent and 
dependent variables become contingent or dependent on a third variable. In our case the 
third variable is ‘effective communication,’ which if developed and practiced 
systematically, can moderate the negative impact of the cases thereby lessening the 
probability of escalatory behavior. This logic is illustrated in Figure 1. 
The figure below suggests that the impact of causes on the decision makers’ 
escalatory behavior is controlled by creating an open culture of communication where 
failures are admitted without any fear of punishment. If organizational communication 
is enhanced the decision-situations become clear enough to at least cut down escalation 
because unhampered communication reduces uncertainty to the extent of mutual 
understanding.  
Figure. 1 Escalation/De-Escalation Model 
 
 
 Escalatory BehaviorCauses of Escalation   
 
 Independent 
Variable Dependent 
Variable
 Uncertainty Reduction Through  
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5. CONCLUSIONS  
 
Escalation is not the result of a syndrome of decision errors. It is rather a 
decision dilemma where the decision maker is caught in such a situation that decision to 
‘stick or quit’ becomes difficult due to the lack of relevant and timely data about ‘what 
exactly is going wrong?’ Given the environmental uncertainty rational decisions are 
hard to be taken and that is why it is said that escalation is a natural tendency.  
Furthermore, personality factors are the moderating variables which influence 
the relationship of decision makers with the environmental uncertainty. Moreover, 
escalation is determined at least in part by the decision-maker’s unwillingness to admit 
that his prior allocation of resources to chosen courses of action were in vain.  
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